ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ment on a contract for doubloons would follow the same rule, and
be not for doubloons, but for the value which the doubloons would
have had if delivered according to the contract. Why should a
contract for gold dollars receive a different or more favorable
construction, and entitle the party who seeks to enforce it to an
anomalous judgment, not for compensation, but for the things, or
rather for the class of things contracted for? Judgments should
be so shaped and moulded that the benefit to one party may be
attained with the least amount of injury to the other, and this is
what the law has done by rendering them for currency generally,
and leaving the defendant free to choose that sort of current
money which can be obtained with the least difficulty; but a judgment and execution solely for gold, or exclusively for silver,
might impose a burden on the defendant which he ought not to
be compelled to bear, and lead to the sacrifice of his property
without any corresponding advantage to the plaintiff. And as the
present writ of fieri facias sins against these principles, and
departs from the even tenor which every judgment should pursue,
by limiting the sheriff to one particular kind of currency, instead
of leaving the defendant free to pay, and puichasers under the
writ free to buy in all, it is set aside in accordance with the prayer
of the defendants.
Rule absolute.
STROUD, J., dissented.
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Contract topay the Debt of Another, when valid.-A firm sold out their

partnership effects to another, who agreed verbally to pay the firm debts.
One of the firm creditors sued the purchaser for his debt, relying on the
-contract of sale, without showing that he was a party to it. Beld., that
he could not recover, for the agreement upon which the action was brought
was not in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, aa
required by the Act 26th April, 1855. Shoemaker vs. King.
1 From Robert E. Wright, Esq., State Reporter, to be reported in the 4th volume

of his Reports.
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Though such a contract is valid between the immediate parties to it, it
is void as a contract in favor of the creditors of the parties, unless they,
as a part of the arrangement, give up their original claims and accept the
new contract instead. Without this it is void, when expressly made to
the creditors, and therefore it cannot be iniplied as made to them. While
the old debt remains, the new contract cannot be a substituted, but is only
a collateral one-a promise to pay another's debt, which is'forbidden by
the statute, as a cause of action.
d.
Act of May 6th, 1844, relative to "Lapsed Legacies," construed.-Distr6bution.per stirpes and per capita.-Constructionof Wil.-Under section 2d of Act 6th May, 1844, a bequest by a testator to his sister is valid,
though she was dead when the will was written, but left children who
survived the testator: Minter's Appeal.
Where the testator directed his bequests to be distributed, "share and
share alike among the children of my brother Adam, and the children of
my brother Martin, and to my sister Barbara," who died before -him leaving
children; but by another clause in the will, the mode of distribution was
rendered doubtful; it was held, that the legal statutory form of distribution should be applied, and that the legatees should be classified in three
classes, allowing each class to take as their parents would have done, per
stirpes: 7d.
Distributionof rPersonalEstate of Decedent as between first and second
Cousins.-Under the Act of 27th April, 1855, the children of deceased
uncles and aunts take by representation, such part of the estate of a
decedent as the parents would be entitled to if living. The rule of distribution isper stirpes and notper capita: Brenneman's Apeal.
That act constituted the grandchildren of brothers and sisters, and the
children of uncles and aunts, additional classes of collateral heirs, as contradistinguished from next of kin, and they, therefore, take as such, when
entitled to inherit, and not as next of kin as under the Act of 1833: Rd.
The second cousins of the decedent are not entitled to a distribution
under the act: whenever they are entitled to inherit, it must be as next
of kin, and their distribution isper capita: ld.
.Liabilitylof Stockholder for Debts of Xanufactuing Corporation.mJoinder of Defendants.-Defence to the Action.-The Act of April 20th,
1853, supplementary to the Act of April 7th, 1849, entitled an "Act to
encourage Manufacturing Operations in this Commonwealth," renders the
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stockholders in all companies incorporated in pursuance of its provisions,
or under the act of 1849 and its supplements, liable for all debts contracted
*while they are stockholders, although they have paid up the whole of
their stock: Patterson & Co. vs. The Wyomissing Manufacturing Company et al.
Though the corporation is the principal debtor, and the liability of the
stockholders is only secondary and collateral, yet the form of the remedy
and the character of the right, under the Acts of Assembly, allow the
use of separate actions against the primary and secondary debtors: Id.
In an action against stockholders, brought to enforce such liability, the
plaintiff may join the corporation, even though he has previously obtained
a judgment against it, for a portion of the debt sued for : Id.
It is not a good plea in bar to an action against the stockholders, that
the corporation had not paid the bonus of one-half per cent. on the amount
of the original capital stock, as required by the state: the proviso to the
Act of April 20th, 1853, is not properly a proviso, but an additional law:
Id.
Resolutions of City Councils of Harrisburg,not valid unless approved by
Mayor and recorded.-Regulations,Resolutions, and Ordinances, defined
and distinguished.-A resolution of the city councils, which is to be executed and carried into effect by the mayor, must be presented to him for
his approval and be recorded, in order to be valid: Kepner vs. The Commonwealt'.
Where by one section of the act incorporating the city, it was provided,
that the council may make "by-laws, ordinances, resolutions, and regulations," and by another, that "by-laws and ordinances" were to be submitted
to the mayor for his approval, it was held, that there was no such distinction between the sections, as would require that "by laws and ordinances"
should, and "regulations and resolutions" should not be submitted to the
mayor, to be approved by him: Id.
PersonalLiabilityof Granteenot impliedfrom mention of Encumbrance
in habendum of Deed sealed only by Grantor.-Covenant,interpreted
by intention 'of Parties.-Remedy to recover Money charged on Land
during Life of Widow.-Devisee of Land subject to Widow's Thirds takes
cum onere.-One bought land subject to the payment of the dower of a
widow charged upon it in the hands of the grantor, but the grantee did
not sign nor seal. the deed, in the habendurn of which, the charge of the
dower was expressed: he devised the land to his daughter by his will,
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and after his death, and when the dower had become payable by the death
of the widow, an action of debt was brought against his executors for the
dower, by those entitled thereto. Reid, that the words in the habendum,
of the deed to the testator, -did not in themselves import a covenant or
promise by the acceptance of it, to be personally answerable to discharge
the dower: Shoenberger's .Executors vs. Hay et at.
The true rule for the interpretation of covenants, is so to expound them
as to give effect to the actual intent of the parties, as collbeted from the
whole instrument; though the result may be, that words Ter se, implying
a personal obligation, will be denied the effect of a covenant or a personal
promise to pay, without regard to the enjoyment of the property: Id.
That the devisee of the testator took the estate subject to the dower: Id.
Liability of MAarried Woman for Purchase-money of Real Estate.Bond and Mortgage of, when valid.- Waiver of Twelve Months' Delay
in issuing scirefacias.-A married woman bought land, received the deed
and gave bond and mortgage, all in her own name alone, for the balance
of the purchase-money, to be paid at the death of two annuitants, to
whom the interest was to be paid annually during life. By condition in
the bond, the principal could "be collected as if fully due," on default
for six months in paying the interest. Reld, that upon such default, the
O
principal could be collected by suit upon the mortgage: lass vs. Warwick.
Though in strict law a married woman has no power to make such contracts, except when joined with her husband, yet, in order to prevent
great injustice, they will be enforced in equity, and according to the
necessities of common justice, rather than to the terms of the contract: 17d.
Surety on Bond of Assignee for Creditors,Liabilit of What Acts of
Creditor will relieve Suret.-The mere omission of a creditor to sue the
principal debtor, does not discharge a surety; but where the creditor has
the means of satisfaction, either actually or potentially, in his hands, and
does not retain it, the surety is discharged: Richards vs. The Commonwealth.
A. became surety for an assignee B., into whose hands a distribution
out of the estate of his assignor C. came for a creditor D., who died
before the account was finally settled; afterwards, B. himself made an
assignment for the benefit of his creditors, who were paid in full and a
surplus returned to the assignor. The administrator of the creditor D. in
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neither instance presented his claim for payment, but afterwards, brought
suit against the surety A., for the distribution to which he was entitled,
under the original assignment of C. to B. : Held, that he was entitled to
recover, notwithstanding his inactivity and neglect in presenting his claim;
that the creditor had not the possession, actual or potential, of the means
of satisfaction; that mere forbearance would not discharge the surety, who
under the law had the means, by notice to the creditor, to compel him to
collect the claim against the principal debtor, and that unless the surety
had given such notice, lapse of time, in itself, would be no defence: Id.
ParolEvidence of Contents of Lost Records, when admissible.-Decree
of Divorce not to be reversed Collateralbj.-Evdenceof Fraud not admissible, if Collusive.-Divorce, when a Bar to Dower.-Evidence of the
contents of lost portions of the record is admissible after existence and
loss have been proved: .Miltimore vs. .Ailtimore and De Bourbon.
A wife obtained a decree of divorce A. V. 1. from her husband, on
the ground of adultery, having herself procured the issuing of the subpoena, but twelve days before the ensuing term. After more than seven
years, on the death of her husband, she endeavored to avoid the decree
on the ground of irregularity, and demanded dower in her husband's
estate. Held, that she was estopped by her own acts, and that the decree
of the court'having jurisdiction both of the cause of action, and the
parties, was not void, but only voidable if taken in time by a party who
had a right to object: Id.
Evidence is not admissible on the part of the demandant, that there was
fraud in obtaining the decree, in that the application for divorce was collusive. Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem, etc. The principle of estoppel
applies, though, without reference to the decree of divorce, she could
make out a primdfacie case for dower: Id.
It was not error in the court to charge the jury, that there having been
a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, which remained unreversed and unappealed from, the demandant was not entitled to dower in
the real estate of the decedent: Id.
Forfeiture of Charternot to be tried Collaterally.-EuitableEstoppel.
-On the trial of an action of assumpsit by plaintiffs, who were owners of
a turnpike road, against a defendant for tolls due for the use of the road,
a plea involving a forfeiture or invalidity of the charter is demurrable, or
may be treated as a nullity by the court. The violation of a charter of
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incorporation, cannot be made the subject of a judicial'investigation in a
collateral suit: Dyer & Co. vs. Wal-er & Howard.
Where the defendants had used the road, and had contracted to pay for
such use, there being no other claimants for the tolls, they are in equity
estopped from setting up defects in the plaintiff's title, or the charter if
there were any; and they are liable to pay for the use of the road, if not
prevented from using it, by the defects alleged: Id.
SUPREME COURT OP MASSACHUSETTS.

1

.Deostion-O.ffier-Arrest-Escape.--Noexception lies to the decisiou
of a judge of the superior court upon the question whether a deposition
which has been read in evidence in a trial shall be delivered to the jury
when they retire to consider of their verdict: Withead vs. Keyes.
In an action against a sheriff for an escape suffered by his deputy, the
return of a rescue upon the writ is not conclusive evidence in favor of the
defendant: Id.
An officer is not bound to call for aid in the service of mesne process,
and is not liable for an escape that might have been prevented by his
calling for aid: Id.
An officer is bound to use all reasonable and proper personal exertions
to secure a person for whose arrest be has a writ; and if, in the opinion
of the jury, he has not done so, he may be held liable for an escape,
altlough he used all such exertions as he deemed necessary at the time:
Id.
An officer 6ffects an arrest by laying his hand upon a person whom he
has authority to arrest, for the purpose of arresting him, although he may
not succeed in stopping or holding him: Id.
Composition with Creditors-FraudidentAgrcernent.-If a voluntary
assignment for the benefit of creditors has been executed by a debtor,
upon the delivery to him of a release from his debts, a creditor who, by a
secret agreement not to claim any portion of the proceeds of the estate,
induced the assignee, who was also a creditor, to sign the release and to
procure the signatures of other creditors thereto, cannot maintain an
action against the assignee to recover the dividend upon his debt: Frost
vs. Gage.
I From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter; to be published in the forthcoming

volume of his reports.
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Way.-No action lies to recover damages for the obstruction of a highway, against a city which is bound to keep it in repair, by an individual
whose place of business thereby becomes more difficult to reach, his
business injured, the delivery of articles which he has sold and the
gathering in of his crops more expensive, his houses less desirable for
tenants, and his rents diminished in value, if other persons suffer damages
from the same cause, similar in kind, though less in degree: Willard vs.
City of Cambridge.
Conversion.-Onewho receives goods into his possession and control,
knowing that they were not lawfully in the possession of the person who
brought them to him, and afterwards allows them to be taken away by
the same person, is not thereby guilty of a conversion: Loring vs.
.MuIcahy.
Divorce; Fraud.-This court has power, under Gen. Sts. c. 107, § 4,
to declare a marriage void, into which a man was induced to enter by
confiding in representations of the woman whom he took for his wife that
she was chaste, when in fact she was with child by another man, if her
husband repudiated her as soon as he had reason .to know the fact:
Reynolds vs. Reynolds.
Bailment-Negligence.-The hirer of a horse who, by improperly
feeding and watering him, has made him sick, and returns him in this
condition to the owner, is liable for his full value, if the owner, by the
use of reasonable care and the employment of a suitable veterinary
surgeon, who treats him according to his best judgment, is unable to cure
him; although such treatment was in fact improper, and contributed to
the horse's death: Eastman vs. Sanborn.
Pauper.-One who, being in need of immediate relief and support,
has received the same from the town of his lawful settlement, is not, in
the absence of fraud, liable to an action by the town therefor, although
he was possessed of property at the time: Inhabitantsof Stow vs. Sawyer.
Fraud-orelosureof Mortgage.-An action to foreclose a mortgage
which has not been discharged, but has been delivered up to the mortgagor, together with the note which it was given to secure, may be maintained, by proving to the satisfaction of the jury that the note has never
in fact been paid, and that such delivery of the note and mortgage was
procured through the fraud of the mortgagor, in falsely representing that
another worthless note and mortgage of real estate, delivered to and
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accepted by the mortgagee in exchange therefor, were good and sufficient:
GCrimes vs. Kimball.
Insolvent Debtors.-A promissory note is not provable in insolvency
against the estate of an indorser, before its maturity: Stowell vs. Richardson.
.Foreclosure of Mortgage by Second Mortgagee- Executors. -A
second mortgagee of land may maintain an action to foreclose his mortgage
against the first mortgagee, who is in possession for the purpose of foreclosure, if the latter is also the owner of the equity of redemption; and
under his execution may be put temporarily in possession, without an
actual ouster of the first mortgagee: Cronin vs. .Hazletine.
One of two executors may assign a mortgage given to his testator: Note.
Fraud.-The purchaser of a note and a mortgage given as security
therefor, who had an opportunity to examine the property described in the
mortgage, cannot maintain an action of tort against the seller for falsely
and fraudulently representing to him that the security of the mortgage
was undoubted, and the property conveyed was of great value over and
above all encumbrances, and amply worth the amount of the note, and
could be sold for its face at any time: Vease vs. Doton.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORE.'

Inland Lakes-R parian Proprietors-Landunder Water-Obstruetion,of View.-An inland lake, five miles long and three-fourths of a mile
wide, having no current and no main inlet, is not, in any legal or just
sense of the term, navigable water: Ledyard vs. Ten Eyck.
Where the State issued a patent, embracing a portion of such a lake
within its boundaries, the northern line crossing the lake, but there was
no restriction or exception of the lake, no reference made to it, and no
reservation of the water or the land under the water, it was held, that the
grant carried the southern portion of the lake to the grantee, absolutely:
Id.
Where lands are bounded, in a deed of conveyance, by a lake of that
description and the outlet thereof, the title of the grantee extends usque
ad medium filum aquw. At all events, the deed will carry the right to
land subsequently filled in, where the water is shallow, immediately in
front of the grantee's premises: Id.
1 From the Hon.

0. L. Barbour, Reporter of the Court.
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Where the State has sold and conveyed land bounded by a navigable
lake or river, it holds the title to the land under water in front of the
premises as trustee for the public, in order to protect navigation and prevent hindrances or obstructions. At the same time the State declares
itself trustee for the riparianproprietor,and provides that grants shall
be made to him alone, and that they will be made not only for purposes
of commerce, but wherever proper for the beneficial enjoyment of his
adjacent lands: id.
Where the public authorities proceed to deepen. the outlet of a lake,
and deposit the earth and stones that are removed in the shallow water in
front of and adjacent to premises previously conveyed to another, it is a
visible and public declaration that that portion of the lake can no longer
be used for navigation; and the grantee will enter into possession, and
the trusteeship of the State, both for the public and the riparian proprietor, is virtually at an end: Id.
No action will lie against such riparian proprietor, in favor of an
adjoining owner, to restrain the planting of trees upon such newly
acquired land, and thereby obstructing the plaintiff's view of the
lake: Id.
Title to Land occupied by a Turnpike Road-Deeds bounding Lands by
a Highway-Possession sufficient to maintain Trespass or Ejectment.Where the language of a statute, incorporating a turnpike company, is
such as to vest the title to the land over which the road passes in the
company, it must nevertheless be considered as vested only for the purposes of the road; and when the road is abandoned the land reverts to the
original owners: Dunham vs. Williams.
Where premises conveyed by deed were bounded easterly by a road or
public highway, without any words indicating an intention to limit the
eastern boundary to the westerly line of the road: field, that the words
of the grant included, by fair interpretation, the one-half of the road
bed: Id.
And where the grantees and those claiming under them, had been in
the actual possession of the lands adjoining the road, under such a deed
of conveyance, subject to the pubic easement of the highway, for more
than seventy years, it was held that they were in the constructive if not
the actual possession of the western half of the road bed, sufficiently to
enable them to maintain trespass or ejectment: Id.
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Religious Societies; Actions by Trustees.-Where the right of persons
claiming to be trustees of a religious society, to the office of trustee, is
disputed and denied, and they have not yet been admitted to the exercise
of any of its rights or duties, and they are not and have not been in
possession of the church edifice, nor of any of the temporalities of the
church, they cannot maintain an action in the name of the religious
society, to restrain individuals in possession and claiming to be the trustees of the society, duly elected, from closing the church edifice and preventing the pastor from holding religious meetings therein, &c.: North.
Baptist Church vs. Parkeret al.
Before they can institute or maintain such an action, the plaintiffs must
have been peaceably admitted to the office of trustees of the society, or
have established their title thereto by a direct proceeding or action,
brought for that purpose, by the attorney-general: id.
The court will not, upon motion, decide who are the rightful trustees
of the society, or determine the question of right to the office: Id.
Statutes- Taxation and Assessrment.-If the State has the power to
levy and collect a tax or assessment, to be paid to a railroad compan& as a
compensation for the relinquishment of certain rights, it has the power to
direct the transfer of the assessment, collectively, to the same company,
for the same purpose, before its payment: People ex rel. Crowell et al. vs.
Lawrence et al.
When the legislature determines that a public improvement will be a
benefit to the adjacent property, and that the expenses of making the
same shall be paid by the owners of such adjacent property, the courts have
nothing to do with the correctness or incorrectness of the determination,
but must assume the fact to be as the legislature assumes or declares it: Id.
The wisdom or justice of the taxation is not a subject of judicial
inquiry; nor is the purpose for which the tax is to be imposed: Id.
The legislature is not confined, in such taxation, to existing political or
civil districts; but may create a district for the purpose of taxation or
assessment; and may impose the tax equally or pro, rata upon all the
property in the district thus formed pro re nata, or upon a rule of estimated benefit to different owners or individuals; and the proceeds of the
assessment may be applied to some public or quasi public purpose or to
compensation to, or the redress of, individuals: Id.
Lien of Vendor.-Whenever a vendor has manifested an intention not
to rely on his lien upon the lands sold for the purchase-money, he will be
considered as having waived it: Coit vs. Fougera.
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So if a vendor, for a portion of the purchase-money, agrees to take a
conveyance of other property, and a deed of such property is accordingly
executed by the vendee, and delivered in escrow, the lien of the vendor
will be gone. If the depositary refuses to deliver the deed, the remedy
of the vendor is upon the agreement of sale between him and the purchaser to compel the delivery of the deed: 1d.
Carriers of Passengers-Liabilityfor Negligence of Others.-In the
case of travel by passengers upon an ordinary highway in a public conveyance-especially where the highway is a crowded city street-the possibility of negligence or misconduct of the owners or drivers of other
vehicles, over whom the carrier has no control, is a risk which a passenger
cannot cast upon the carrier, but must, so far as the latter is concerned,
take upon himself: Spooner vs. Brooklyn City Railroad Company.
Hence, if a passenger in a vehicle upon a city street voluntarily assumes
a position which is not intended and ordinarily used for the conveyance
of passengers, and which is exposed to danger from the misconduct of
others, he himself contributes to an injury which he sustains by a collision produced by the wilful or the negligent acts of a third party, without
any fault of the carrier; and he cannot recover against the latter: ld.
Purchasers at Judicial Sales-.3femorandum.-The remedy against a
purchaser who refuses to complete a purchase under a decree or judgment
of a court of equity, is by an application to the court to compel him to
complete it, or to resell the property, and hold him liable for the loss and
the additional expenses: _Miller vs. Collyer.
A paper signed by an individual, on becoming a purchaser of property
at a sheriff's sale under a judgment, by which he agrees to comply with
the conditions of sale, is not a contract either with the sheriff or the
plaintiff in the foreclosure suit, upon which an action can be maintained
by the latter, as the assignee of the sheriff: ld.
Such an instrument, in the form of a memorandum at the foot of the
conditions of sale, signed by the purchaser, is merely a submission by him
to the jurisdiction of the court, in the foreclosure suit, as a purchaser
under the judgment therein: Id.
It seems, that conditions of sale by a sheriff on execution, imposing
upon the purchaser a liability to pay the amount of any deficiency in case
of a resale, will not apply to any case except that of a resale made forthwith, upon failure of the purchaser to pay the required per centage of his
purchase: Id.

